The College Bowl Alliance and the Sherman Act by Darling, Lafcadio
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 21 | Number 2 Article 4
1-1-1998
The College Bowl Alliance and the Sherman Act
Lafcadio Darling
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lafcadio Darling, The College Bowl Alliance and the Sherman Act, 21 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 433 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol21/iss2/4




I. What is the Bowl Alliance? ....................................... 436
A . H istory ............................................................... 437
B. The Bowl System Today ...................................... 442
II. The Bowl Alliance in an Antitrust Framework .......... 443
A. What Part of the Sherman Act Applies? .............. 443
III. The Legal Standard Under Section 1 of the Sherman
A ct ........................................................................... 4 4 8
A. The Purposes of the Sherman Act § 1 ................. 448
B. In Search of the Correct Level of Review ............. 449
1. The Three Levels of Review ............................. 450
2. The Per Se Rule Applied ................................. 451
3. Quick Look Rule of Reason ............................ 454
4. Rule of Reason ............................................... 457
a. The Bowl Alliance Under the Rule of
R eason ...................................................... 459
IV . Conclusion ............................................................... 466
*Associate, Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malarica, Peterson, & Daheim, Tacoma,
WA; J.D., University of California Hastings College of the Law, 1999; B.A.,
University of San Diego, 1996. The author wishes to thank Professor Ashutosh
Bhagwat for his invaluable guidance and assistance, Eugene Crew for his great
antitrust knowledge and useful comments, and Christine Alar for her support,
laughter, and complete friendship. Thanks and recognition also go to the 1998-
99 Executive Board and members of Hastings Communications and
Entertainment Law Journal for the many hours given and contributions made to
a great journal. Any wrong-headedness is entirely the doing of the author.
Introduction
This note explores the question, recently asked by
observers and Congress, of whether the college football Bowl
Alliance' (hereinafter "the Alliance") constitutes a violation of
the Sherman Act. I conclude that, even though a successful
antitrust action against the Alliance would be unlikely, the
agreements which constitute the Alliance would probably be
found unlawful under section 1 of the Act, were such an
action brought.
Since the emergence of college football on the national
sports scene many decades ago, determining which school
should be crowned "national champion" in a given year has
been fraught with difficulty, disorganization, and controversy.
Fans, coaches, and sports writers have perennially watched
powerful teams play successful seasons and, at the end,
debated as to which of that year's best would have the
advantage in a hypothetical match-up. These disputes were
rarely settled on the field since actual games between the
year's best teams often did not occur. Top contenders were
frequently in different conferences and regions, and were
unable to play one another for the title of national champion.
Consequently, the arguments were usually not resolved on the
field of play, and the arguments went on.
Unlike most college and professional sports, in which
such competing claims of superiority are settled by a playoff,
the Division I-A college football season has traditionally ended
with a series of bowl games.2 Until recently, the bowls
generally consisted of match-ups between inter-conference
1. After this note was written, the Bowl Alliance changed its name, and a
similar association of conferences and bowls is now known as the Bowl
Championship Series ("BCS"). Although the name has changed, the antitrust
concerns remain the same, as the agreements and arrangements which
constitute the BCS are virtually the same as I describe in this note.
2. The first bowl game is thought to have occurred in 1894 between the
University of Chicago and Notre Dame University. See Antitrust Implications of
the Bowl Alliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights,
and Competition, 105th Cong. 9, 43 (1997) [hereinafter Antitrust Hearing]. The
next known bowl game was the first Rose Bowl in 1902, and the bowl system
does not seem to have become widespread until the 1920's. See id.
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rivals or nationally prominent schools, but frequently did not
include a game between the nation's strongest teams that
season.' Thus, the schools and their fans have often been left
at the end of the college, football season with two or more
dominant teams and only the semi-subjective rankings
(generated by writers and coaches) to tell them who is "#1" for
that year.4  Although the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA)5 has set up a playoff system for all other
intercollegiate sports, as well as for football in the lower
divisions, the bowl system has remained intact for the Division
I-A football schools.6
Ostensibly in response to growing discontent with the lack
of a clear national championship decided on the field of play,
the first incarnation of the Bowl Alliance was formed. The
stated purpose of the Alliance was to insure that a national
champion was determined each year by matching the first and
second ranked teams in a post-season bowl. While the
prospect of assuring a national championship game was well-
received, the limited membership and exclusivity of the
Alliance and its member bowls began to raise concerns. Most
prominently, the charge was made that the Alliance
constituted a violation of the antitrust laws, as embodied in
3. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 33-36.
4. The National Collegiate Athletic Association [hereinafter NCAA awards
the national championship to the team which finishes first in the combined AP
and ESPN-USA Today coaches polls. See Don Borst, The BCS for Beginners
(visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://web4.sportsline.com/ulpage/covers/
football/college/dec98/bcsbegin/2198.htm>. Even if one accepts the wisdom of
the voters, problems remain. For example, in the 1997-98 college football
season, the University of Michigan and the University of Nebraska were crowned
co-champions, since the teams were tied in the final poll. See Richard
Rosenblatt, Michigan, Nebraska Split National Title (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
<http: //washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/colfoot/longterm/ 1997/bowls/
news/title3.htm>.
5. The NCAA, founded in 1905, is a non-profit organization composed of
colleges that engage in sports and is designed to promulgate rules and act as a
neutral body to regulate intercollegiate athletics. See Antitrust Hearing, supra
note 2, at 44-47.
6. NCAA football is divided into four Divisions (I-A, I-AA, II, and III) with the
goal of matching up schools of roughly equivalent size, athletic excellence, and
financial strength. See id.
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the Sherman Act,7 since it excluded certain conferences and
teams and altered the free market of the bowl system.
Although subsequent changes to the Alliance rules have been
made in an attempt to address, these problems, many
antitrust questions continue to surround this amorphous set
of agreements known as the Bowl Alliance: What is the
relevant market? What role do the Alliance members play?
What are the Alliance's purposes and effects? Do these
agreements, through their purpose or effects, unreasonably
restrain trade? Are there any less restrictive alternatives?
This note will examine the factual features of the Bowl
Alliance and analyze the antitrust issues which they raise. It
will initially detail the genesis and history of the Alliance so
that its creation and operation can be fully understood. Next,
it will discuss the sections of the Sherman Act the Alliance has
been accused of violating and will assess which of these
claims are the strongest. It will then attempt to characterize
the markets which are affected by the Alliance to allow a
coherent assessment of if and how these competitors are
damaged by the operation of the Alliance. After the
background is laid, this note will discuss the applicable
antitrust standards that courts use, and evaluate which would
likely be applied to the Bowl Alliance. Finally, it will apply the
legal standard that seems most appropriate to the Bowl
Alliance in an effort to decide whether a hypothetical trier of
fact would find that the Alliance does indeed cross the
antitrust line drawn by the Sherman Act.
I
What is the Bowl Alliance?
The Bowl Alliance does not have a concrete beginning or
distinct structure, but rather is a set of vertical and horizontal
agreements which has changed shape several times since its
inception. In order to understand how the present Bowl
Alliance works, it is useful to look at the origins of the present
post-season bowl system.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1997).
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A. History
Before the Bowl Alliance was introduced into post-season
college football, the bowl system worked on a mixed bidding
and placement system.8 Stated simply, a college team would
get invited to a bowl for one of two reasons. First, if the team
finished the season at a designated place'in its conference
standings, it would be invited pursuant to an automatic bid.9
For example, the team which won the Pacific 10 Conference
was automatically entitled to play in the Rose Bowl. Second, a
team which did not qualify for one of these designated spots
could be invited to a bowl, based on that bowl's decision that
the school would be a desirable participant in that year's bowl
game. This second method was essentially a bidding process,
in which certain available teams would receive multiple
invitations and have a choice of bowls.1" Each of the bowls had
an independent governing committee which made the
selection decisions and followed its own rules." Thus, the pre-
Alliance regime consisted of some vertical agreements between
conferences and bowls, alongside a free bidding system for the
remaining bowl slots. This twofold system had the advantage
of being flexible, since it allowed the selection of a good team
which was not in a traditionally strong conference, while still
giving certain popular conferences some assurance of bowl
play. As expressed above, however, the major disadvantage of
this system was its frequent failure to produce a national
championship game. Indeed, between 1945 and 1991 (the year
the Alliance began), the top two ranked teams played on only
two occasions."
This loose invitation system underwent a dramatic change
with the advent of the Bowl Alliance. The Alliance (originally
8. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 33-34.
9. See id. at 32-33.
10. It is important to note that the NCAA does not oversee or sponsor the
post-season bowls. See id. at 44. Rather, the bowls are "independent entities"
that are certified by the NCAA Special Events Committee. The Committee reviews
bowl policies, selection criteria, and financial details, but has no more than
advisory power over the bowls, and is not involved in television, advertising, and
other such agreements entered into by the bowls. See id. at 44-45
11. See id.
12. See id. at 36-37.
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called the "Bowl Coalition")13 began in 1991 when five major
football conferences- the Southeastern Conference, the
Southwestern Conference (SWC), the Big Eight, 4 the Atlantic
Coast Conference (ACC), and the Big East- and .the
independent Notre Dame University formed a set of
agreements among themselves and with the Committees of
four major post-season Bowls- the Federal Express Orange,
USF&G Sugar, IBM Fiesta, and Mobil Cotton Bowls' 5-to
change the way that bowl teams were selected. Under the
original plan, the Orange Bowl, the Sugar Bowl, and the
Cotton Bowl would invite the champions of the Big Eight, the
Southeastern Conference, and the SWC, respectively, to fill
one of their slots while the Fiesta Bowl had two open slots."
The Bowls also agreed to fill these open positions with the
champions of the ACC, Big East, Notre Dame, and "additional
teams that were attractive and had completed their seasons
with exceptional records."'7 The stated purpose of this
arrangement was to increase the chances of a national
championship game by controlling the pairings in these major
bowls. 8
This arrangement proved to have several flaws, both
practical and legal. As an initial matter, the main justification
offered for the creation of the Alliance- a national
championship game- was still elusive. If, for example, the
University of Florida was the Southeastern Conference
champion and number one in the national rankings, and the
University of Nebraska was the Big Eight champion and
number two, Florida would still have been obliged to play in
13. In the interest of clarity, I will refer to the Coalition, as well as the earlier
and present versions of the Alliance all as the "Bowl Alliance" or "Alliance."
14. The Big Eight Conference merged with part of the now defunct
Southwestern Conference to form the Big 12, which is part of the present
Alliance. See Letter from Senators Mitch McConnell, Robert F. Bennett, Craig
Thomas, and Mike Enzi, United States Senate, to The Honorable Robert Pitofsky,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission 2 (March 14, 1997) [hereinafter McConnell
Letted (on file with Senator McConnell and the Author).
15. With the demise of the Southwestern Conference, the Cotton Bowl
dropped out of the Alliance scheme. See id.
16. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 34.
17. Id. (testimony of Roy Kramer, Southeastern Conference Commissioner).
18. See id.
VOL. 21:433
ThE COLLEGE BOWL ALLIANCE
the Sugar Bowl while Nebraska would have played in the
Orange Bowl. Additionally, the non-participation in the
Alliance bowls by other conference champions, who were
excluded from the Alliance scheme or who were bound to
participate in non-Alliance bowls (such as the Pac 10 and Big
Ten champions, who played annually in the Rose Bowl) made
it possible, if not likely, that the two top-ranked teams still
would not play each other under the Alliance allocation
scheme.
This plan also presented some antitrust problems. Viewing
the Alliance as a market allocation which "precluded a non-
Alliance team from going to the significant and lucrative
Alliance bowls- even when the non-Alliance team had a better
record and a better ranking than an Alliance team," United
States Senator Mitch McConnell formally requested an
investigation into the Alliance for a possible antitrust violation.
Essentially, his contention was that the Alliance was illegally
dividing the market only among competitors that were
members of the closed Alliance group.' The Department of
Justice complied with this request and began to investigate
the then-existing Alliance."°
In 1994 after the initial three-year term of the original
Bowl Alliance agreements expired, the participants, reacting to
these problems, decided to change the structure of the
Alliance. Under the new plan, the Orange, Sugar, and Fiesta
Bowls would remain the Alliance bowls, but the conferences
were no longer committed to play in a specific bowl. Instead,
the champions of all four conferences would be guaranteed a
slot, and the remaining two slots would be "at-large," and
"open to any team in the country with a minimum of eight
wins or ranked higher than the lowest-ranked conference
champion" of the four Alliance conferences.' Although this
language is permissive, any team that wanted to be considered
was also, according to Senator McConnell, required to sign a
"special restrictive agreement" which entailed a promise by
that school to accept any Alliance invitation over any non-
19. See McConnell Letter, supra note 14, at 3.
20. See id.
21. Id. (Emphasis in original).
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Alliance invitation.22 The new system retained the rotating
national championship plan included in the previous
agreements, in which the top two ranked teams in the nation,
assuming they were both playing in an Alliance bowl, would
play one another in one of the three bowls, rotating annually.
The Big Ten and the Pac 10 also participated in the
revised Alliance, but did not commit to participate in the
Alliance Bowls at that point since they were under contractual
agreement to play in the Rose Bowl through the 1997-98
season.23 This was changed with the creation of the "Super-
Alliance" in 1996, in which the Rose Bowl agreed to become an
Alliance bowl beginning with the 1998-99 season.24 The Rose
Bowl, however, will continue to field the Pac 10 and Big Ten
champions except when (1) it is the Rose Bowl's turn in the
rotation to host the championship game, and (2) when it is not
the Rose Bowl's turn and the Big Ten or Pac 10 champion is
ranked first or second, in which case that team will go to the
designated national championship bowl.25
In addition to these agreements regarding bowl match-ups
among Alliance participants, there is also the allegation that
the Alliance scheme includes an "anti-overlap" agreement,
which prohibits member teams or bowls from playing or
scheduling games that would compete with Alliance Bowls.26
The Alliance, in the person of Southeastern Conference
Commissioner Kramer, denied that such an agreement exists,
pointing to a clause which leaves member schools free to
participate in any non-Alliance bowls if they are not selected
to an Alliance Bowl.27 This clause, however, does not seem to
22. See id.
23. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 35-36.
24. See id. at 2.
25. See id. In the 1998-99 bowl season, which was the first year of the Rose
Bowl's participation in the Alliance, the Rose Bowl hosted a game between UCLA
and the University of Wisconsin, since the schools were the champions of the
Pac- 10 and Big 10, respectively, and neither was ranked in the top two. See Rose
Bowl Preview (visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.foxsports.com/
js_index.frm?content=colfoot/stories/cfl213roseprev.sml>.
26. See McConnell Letter, supra note 14, at 5.
27. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 138-39.
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prove or disprove the existence of a written or unwritten anti-
overlap agreement.
Since the creation of the first Bowl Alliance, there has
been an increase in national championship games played.28
Alongside this, however, has been an increase in concern by
observers that the Alliance is a violation of the Sherman Act,
since (according to its critics) it excludes certain bowls and
conferences from the "top-tier" bowl picture and has led to a
sharp increase in prices paid by television networks for the
Alliance bowls. Senator McConnell, joined by Senators
Bennett, Thomas, and Enzi, has spearheaded an investigation
into this issue and has urged Congress and the Federal Trade
Commission to do the same.29
One of the main sources of controversy that generated
much of this debate arose during the 1996-97 college football
season. During that season, Brigham Young University (BYU)
and the University of Wyoming, both members of the non-
Alliance Western Athletic Conference (WAC), had very
successful seasons. BYU finished with the WAC title, a record
of 13-1, and the number five ranking in the nation. Wyoming,
which lost to BYU in the WAC title game, posted a record of
10-2 and a national ranking of twenty second. Despite these
strong seasons, neither team was invited to play in an Alliance
bowl that year. BYU went to the non-Alliance Holiday Bowl
and Wyoming was not invited to play in any post-season
bowl.3" Further, Alliance conference teams with lower rankings
and worse season records than either BYU or Wyoming were
invited to play in the Alliance Bowls.31 These events rekindled
critics' suspicions, who argued that the "at-large" bids
28. See id. at 36. These games were: Miami vs. Alabama after the 1992
season; Florida State vs. Nebraska after the 1993 season; and Florida vs.
Nebraska after the 1995 season. See id.
29. See McConnell Letter, supra note 14, at 8.
30. See id.
31. These were the University of Texas (8-5 record, No. 20 ranking);
Pennsylvania State University (11-2 record, No.7 ranking); Virginia Tech
University (10-2 record, No.13 ranking) and Nebraska (11-2 record, No. 6
ranking). Id. at 4. Additionally, 13 teams that were not ranked in the top 25 at all




mentioned in the Alliance rules were an illusion that were not
truly open to all teams, and that non-Alliance schools and
conferences were being wrongfully excluded from full
participation in the post-season bowl market, possibly
pursuant to secret or implicit agreements among Alliance
members to exclude non-members.32
On May 22, 1997, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Business Rights, and Competition3 held a hearing to address
these concerns.34 Although the hearing generated some useful
information and possible background for an investigation or
lawsuit, the Subcommittee generally expressed the sentiment
that congressional action was not the solution to this
controversy. 5
B. The Bowl System Today
The entrance of the Alliance onto the college bowl scene
seems to have enhanced the financial benefits for Alliance
participants significantly, but these benefits have not
necessarily extended to all the Division I-A schools.6 In the
1996-97 bowl season, the three Alliance bowls and the Rose
Bowl paid out a total of $67.9 million dollars to eight teams,
while the combined total from all non-Alliance bowl purses
was only $34 million. The total payout to Alliance schools for
that same season was $95.9 million,3 while the non-Alliance
bowl schools received $5.4 million in payouts.3 9 This
divergence of competitors' economic success is a source of
32. See id. 152-54 (responses by Professor Gary Roberts regarding the
Alliance's possible antitrust violations).
33. Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary.
34. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2.
35. During the hearing, Senator Sessions remarked, "I hope that we don't
have the U.S. Government setting bowl picks." Id. at 85.
36. Under the bowl system, most of the revenue from the bowl payouts does
not go directly to the schools, but rather to the conference to which the school
belongs, which then distributes money to all conference members. See Ray
Waddell, Winners & Losers Alike Cash in on Bowl Games, AMUSEMENT Bus., Jan.
8, 1996.
37. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 15.
38. This was a marked increase even from the previous year in which the
same conferences received $69.4 million in bowl payouts. See id.
39. See id.
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concern from an antitrust perspective, since it may indicate
the presence of conduct which harms the competitive market,
by artifically stifling the ability of lesser market participants to
gain ground on the dominators.
II
The Bowl Alliance in an Antitrust Framework
Two key determinations are required before engaging in an
effective Sherman Act analysis of the Bowl Alliance. First, one
must narrow the legal question by deciding which part of the
Act is best suited to scrutinize the activities of the Bowl
Alliance. This is done by comparing the general purposes of
the two major sections of the statute with the nature of the
activities that are alleged to be in violation. Second, the
competitors and markets which are said to be adversely
affected by the Alliance must be defined. This can be the most
difficult part of any antitrust case, but it is vital to a
satisfactory determination of whether these competitors and
markets are being unreasonably restricted from the free
conduct of their activities by the Alliance agreements.
A. What Part of the Sherman Act Applies?
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[elvery contract
combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States[.]' 40 Although the
sweeping language of this provision has been limited to only
those contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that
"unreasonably" restrain trade,4 the statute's condemnation of
all conduct with an anticompetitive purpose or effect remains
clear, and has been applied to a wide range of conduct which
restrains trade, including direct and indirect price-fixing,42
market allocation, 3 group boycotts,4 and even restrictive
college athletics regulations. "5
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
41. See Arizona v. Maricopa County. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43
(1982); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
42. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
43. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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Critics of the Bowl Alliance have characterized it as a form
of market allocation and a group boycott, which has both the
purpose and effect of restraining trade and eliminating
competition. 6 Since the Alliance involves both horizontal
agreements among competitive groups- conferences :and
bowls- as well as vertical dealing agreements between these
entities and television networks and sponsors, an analysis
under section 1 would be appropriate.47
The applicability of section 2 of the Act, however, is
somewhat more questionable. That section forbids
monopolization, attempt to monopolize, or conspiracy to
monopolize. 48 As the Supreme Court has stated and repeated
numerous times, monopolization "has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power."49 Some
have argued that the Alliance is indeed guilty of
monopolization," but an analysis of the Alliance under section
2 is fraught with difficulties.
Professor Roberts, in his statements to the Senate
Subcommittee, argues that "the Alliance has complete control
over a sports entertainment product that its creators tout as
being unique and without substitute in many consumers'
minds[,]"5 and that the Alliance has used this control to
44. See Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) [hereinafter FOGAI.
45. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. University of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA v. Ok.j.
46. See McConnell Letter, supra note 14, at 4-6.
47. It is notable that in NCAA v. Ok., the United States Supreme Court
emphasized that even a non-profit college sports organization is not immune
from Sherman Act scrutiny. See 468 U.S. at 100 n.22 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975)); see also Wendy T. Kirby and T. Clark
Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role of Non-economic Values, 61
IND. L.J. 31 (1985/1986).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).
49. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
50. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 154. It is possible that the
Alliance members engaged in attempted monopolization or conspiracy to
monopolize, but since a claim under section 2 seems less appropriate under
these facts, this note will not explore those possible violations.
51. Id.
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charge "monopoly prices. "52 While this may be true, it does not
get one past the most difficult aspect of any section 2 analysis:
the definition of the market. The threshold requirement of
section 2 that a violator has monopoly power involves an
intricate and thorough assessment of what the competitive
market encompasses. As Professor Roberts acknowledges,
using typical market power economic theories in a sports
context "is almost impossible because of the unusual nature
of the product., 4 He also stated that identifying what market
variables to use in this situation is "a mindboggling
conceptual task."5 5 The ability to show monopoly power by
defining a market that the defendant dominates is often the
most difficult hurdle for a section 2 plaintiff to clear, and in
this case it may not be possible, or even necessary. Section 1
is much broader than section 2 and will generally reach
concerted action that may also be monopolization, without the
additional difficulty of definitively proving monopoly power as
an element. Section 2 is a more effective tool for reaching the
conduct of monolithic organizations that are engaging in
abuse of their power, while section 1 is generally better
designed to cover agreements between separate, non-
dominant entities that have anticompetitive purposes or
effects. 7
Given these considerations, it appears that the most
useful inquiry into the legality of the Bowl Alliance is a section
1 analysis. However, the problem remains of identifying the
relevant markets involved as well as the participants and
52. Id.
53. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. 570; United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
54. Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 154.
55. Id.
56. See ERNEST GELLHORN and WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS at 22-23 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter GELLHORN]. As discussed below,
while market power is not an essential element to a finding of section 1 liability,
it is often a key part of the evidence of an unreasonable restraint. See NCAA v.
Ok., 468 U.S. at 111-12 (discussing market power as a pertinent factor in a
section I analysis).
57. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60
(1911); see also MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION at 156 (4th ed. 1997)
[hereinafter, HANDLER].
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"victims" in an antitrust framework. This identification will
affect both the form and scope of our entire antitrust analysis,
since the focus of the Sherman Act is to preserve competition
in these markets. Since different types of agreements between
competitors, buyers, and sellers require different standards of
scrutiny, it is necessary at the outset to decide which
Sherman Act lens to look through in our examination of the
Bowl Alliance. This is done by characterizing the relevant
parties and conduct.
The first challenge is to identify the markets affected by
the Bowl Alliance. This is an important step to any later
determination of whether the Alliance offends the market-
protecting policies of the Sherman Act. Although a definitive
market definition would require detailed economic analysis
which reaches beyond the scope of this note, it seems, on a
basic level, that the Alliance implicates two main markets: the
bowl market and the television market. The bowl market is the
competitive pool of bowls that have traditionally vied for top
college teams to play in their bowls at the end of each season.
This competitive market has been significantly affected by the
formation of the Alliance since these agreements remove many
top bowls and schools from the open bidding process. The
television market consists of the TV networks which broadcast
or might broadcast post-season 8 college football who compete
in a bidding environment for the rights to broadcast bowl
games. This market is also potentially affected here because
58. It seems reasonable to restrict the market to only post-season football
contracts for economic and legal reasons. First, networks who broadcast bowls
purchase rights to bowl games independently of their other college football
contracts. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 43-45. Additionally, narrower
definitions of markets in unique sports contexts are supported by antitrust
jurisprudence. The NCAA v. Ok. Court expressly approved of the district court's
use of "live college football" on Saturdays as the relevant market, due to the
unique nature of that type of entertainment. See NCAA v. Ok., 468 U.S. at 110-
12 (citing International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S.
242 (1959), which held that "championship boxing events are uniquely attractive
to fans and hence constitute a market separate from that for non-championship
events."). The NCAA v. Ok. Court also specifically held that "broadcasting rights
to college football constitute a unique product for which there is no ready
substitute," which indicates a view that a more general categorization of "sports"
or even "football" as the product would be inappropriate. Id. at 115.
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the prices that the networks have paid has increased
markedly since the advent of the Alliance structure.59
A related inquiry is the relative strength of the Alliance
participants in these markets, which corresponds with the
significance of the impact the Alliance agreements can have on
the overall markets. The Alliance includes 53% of the Division
I-A football schools,6" and Alliance teams collected over 94% of
the total bowl payouts in the 1996-97 season." This numerical
majority and financial hegemony demonstrates the powerful
presence of the Alliance members in both of the relevant
markets and the degree to which the formation and operation
of a set of agreements such as the Alliance can impact these
markets.
Therefore, using antitrust terminology, the following model
is presented by the Bowl Alliance facts: the Alliance contains
both horizontal (among the conferences and among the bowls)
and vertical (between the conferences and the bowls)
agreements in these two competitive markets. The "producers"
in both the bowl and television markets are the bowls
themselves, since they are the range of "products" available to
the post-season college football consumer. The Alliance
conferences and universities are thus the "suppliers" for both
markets. Under this framework, the "consumers" are the
television networks- and possibly the networks' bowl game
advertisers as well- since they pay the bowls (and indirectly
the conferences and schools) for the broadcast of the games.62
The mere presence of these agreements, and the fact that
they may significantly change the complexion of both the bowl
and TV markets, however, is not enough to constitute a
violation of section 1. Section 1 only proscribes "unreasonable"
59. See, e.g., Kirk BohIs, Rose Bowl Makes the Wrong Call on AT&T, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 19, 1998, at CI available in 1998 WL 3618615.
60. The Alliance now encompasses 63 of the 113 Division I-A teams. See
Antitrust Hearing. supra note 2, at 99.
61. See id. at 15.
62. Of course, this characterization is merely this author's estimate of what a
court would be likely to do. It is possible that some would analyze this case
differently and conclude that different categorizations should apply. Indeed,
some critics of the Alliance have characterized these agreements differently than
I do here. See McConnell Letter, supra note 14, at 5.
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restraints of trade which harm competition.63 Thus, before the
Alliance could be held to be liable for a section 1 violation, a
court or jury must find that the relevant markets were
sufficiently harmed by the conduct in question. 64 In order to
make such a determination, the correct antitrust standard
under which the conduct at issue should be examined must
be found and applied to the factual situation of the Alliance.
I
The Legal Standard Under Section
1 of the Sherman Act
A. The Purposes of the Sherman Act § 1
Whenever one interprets and applies any statute, the
goals and policies underlying its enactment and operation
must be considered in the course of that interpretation and
application. This maxim is no less true with the Sherman Act.
Although the exact motives behind the creation of the
Sherman Act is disputed by scholars," it is safe to say that the
law sought to give shape and clarity to pre-existing legal rules
regarding restraints on competition and monopolization.66 In a
sense, the Sherman Act was a re-affirmance of the long-
standing distrust of all forms of cooperation between
competitors in market economies, since such behavior
imperiled free and vigorous competition.67
Accordingly, the basic policy underlying the body of
antitrust law generally, and section 1 of the Act specifically, is
63. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
64. See id.
65. Compare ROBERT BORK, THE ANTRusT PARADOX (1978) with Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
66. Senator Sherman, for whom the statute is named, said that the law "does
not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized
principles of the common law." 21 Cong.Rec. 2456 (1890).
67. Expressing this sentiment, Economic Scholar Adam Smith wrote: "people
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment or diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to
raise prices." ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Edwin Cannon, ed.,
Random House, Inc. 1965) (1789).
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that a group, association, cartel, or any other coalition of
competitors should not be able to use concerted action to
interfere with competition in the market. 8 While this is a
simplistic way of expressing the goals of section 1, it is
mentioned simply to remind us that the tandem of values
embodied in the Act-keep competition free and limit large
oppressive market entities- should be kept in mind when
considering whether the set of agreements that comprise the
Bowl Alliance should be found to be an offending restraint of
trade and an unlawful stifling of the freedom of all
competitors.
B. In Search of the Correct Level of Review
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[elvery
contract ... in restraint of trade or of commerce... is
illegal.""9 Although the Supreme Court originally took the
position that this broad language covered all restraints of
trade,7 ° the impracticality and doctrinal awkwardness of such
an approach soon became apparent 71 and courts wisely refined
the doctrine to "prohibit only those contracts or combinations
that are 'unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.'
72
As the Court once noted, "[elvery agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of
their very essence."7 Therefore, the challenge is to determine
which restraints will be invalidated as unreasonable and
offensive to the policies of the Sherman Act.
68. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
70. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
71. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (carving out
an exception to the broad holding of Trans-Missouri only one year later, stating
that "[a]n agreement entered into for the purpose of promoting the legitimate
business of an individual or corporation, with no purpose to thereby affect or
restrain interstate commerce, and which does not directly restrain such
commerce, is not, as we think covered by the act ...." Id. at 567-68).
72. United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d. Cir. 1993)
(quoting Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911)).
The Brown court also noted that "[c]ourts long ago realized that literal
application of section one would render virtually every business arrangement
unlawful." Id.
73. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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The development of Sherman Act doctrine and application
has yielded three basic approaches used by courts to make
this determination. 4 These are: the per se rule, "quick look"
rule of reason, and the traditional rule of reason.7" Which of
these tests applies is generally a function of the nature of the
conduct alleged and sometimes the nature of the market
involved .76
1. The Three Levels of Review
As federal courts heard and ruled on Sherman Act cases
in the first half of this century, judicial experience and stare
decisis combined to generate the per se rule in section 1
cases.77 The per se rule simply creates a conclusive
presumption of a Sherman Act violation for certain types of
behavior, upon a showing that the defendant's conduct fits
into one of the per se categories that have been recognized by
courts. 78 The reasoning behind the per se rule is that certain
types of combinations or agreements will so often amount to a
Sherman Act violation, regardless of the intent of the
participants or the justifications offered, that a conclusive rule
condemning the conduct is justified.79 Following this logic,
courts have refused to engage in a detailed (and costly) market
and effects analysis of conduct that fits into a per se category,
since such a close look would almost never save the prohibited
conduct from section 1 condemnation.0 Because courts are
slow to create such strong presumptions, there are only a
handful of categories that trigger the per se rule. Examples of
74. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 668.
75. See id.
76. See Arizona v. Maricopa County. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
77. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150; United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
78. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344-47.
79. As the Court once expressed it: "Congress has not left us with the
determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or
unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous
competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing conspiracies."
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 221-22.
80. See id.
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conduct that subjects a case to the per se rule are price-
fixing,81 resale price maintenance, 82 and market allocations."
2. The Per Se Rule Applied
Although some of the critics argue that the agreements
which form the Alliance take the form of a group boycott or
market allocation,8 4 it seems unlikely that a court would use
the per se rule in this context. While it is true that the
restrictive agreements that constitute the Bowl Alliance
resemble refusals to deal, which have traditionally been
subject to the per se rule,8 two factors militate for a closer
examination of the Alliance than the per se rule allows.86 First,
the trend by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
in recent decades has been to apply the per se rule to group
boycotts and refusals to deal selectively and only under
certain circumstances.8" Second, and more importantly, courts
have recognized the unique characteristics of sports leagues
and their markets, which require some degree of interaction
between competitors in order to exist at all, and have thus
disfavored the inflexible per se rule, which is designed for
restraints in traditional commercial contexts.88
The view that dominated antitrust jurisprudence until
recent years was that all conduct that could be technically
categorized as a refusal to deal would be viewed under the
stringent per se rule and thus struck down.89 However, as the
81. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 332; Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 150.
82. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 332.
83. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
84. See McConnell Letter, supra note 14, at 5-6.
85. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
86. It should be noted that other antitrust characterizations of the Bowl
Alliance have also been offered. For example, Professor Roberts charges that the
"Alliance has created a monopoly" Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 155. Aside
from my belief that the monopoly standards are less appropriate to an antitrust
examination of the Alliance, I have chosen to limit my discussion to only those
characterizations that most closely fit the facts of the Alliance, although other
theories of liability might well prove fruitful avenues of legal analysis.
87. See GELLHORN, ANTITRUST, supra note 56, at 206-07.
88. SeeNCAA v. Ok., 468 U.S. at 100-01.
89. The Klor's Court stated that "[giroup boycotts, or concerted refusals to
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law on refusals to deal has developed to adapt to a greater
variety of fact patterns and situations, courts have shown a
greater willingness to use a more relaxed standard in some
group boycott cases.90 This has mainly grown out of a
recognition by courts that the per se rule should be applied
with care and only to certain specific categories of conduct.91
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery
and Printing Co.,92 the Supreme Court enunciated this
reluctance to apply the per se rule in the group boycott
context: "Unless the cooperative possesses market power or
exclusive access to an element essential to effective
competition, the conclusion that the expulsion is virtually
always likely to have anticompetitive effects is not
warranted."93 These more recent cases seem to support the
view that not all refusals to deal will be given equal per se
treatment under section 1.
Moreover, courts have long held that "judicial inexperience
with a particular arrangement counsels against extending the
reach of per se rules."94 Although antitrust cases involving
sports are far from uncommon,95 the unusual facts and
conditions of the post-season bowl markets would present a
unique type of sports restraint to a court, counseling
deal, have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They have not been
saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor
by a failure to show that they 'fixed or regulated prices, parceled out or limited
production, or brought about a deterioration in quality.'" 359 U.S. at 212
(footnotes omitted) (quoting FOGA, 312 U.S. at 466, 467-68); see also Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
90. See Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Indiana Fed'n. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
460-61 (1986).
91. See GELLHORN, supra note 56, at 220-21.
92. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
93. Id. at 296.
94. NCAA v. Ok., 468 U.S. at 101, n.21 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10; United States v. Topco Associates,
405 U.S. 596, 607-08; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963)).
95. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996); NCAA v.
Ok., 486 U.S. 85; Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1982);
Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979); Bridge Corp. of
Am. v. The American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.
1970).
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reluctance to use the per se mechanism. Thus, even though
the per se rule seemingly continues to enjoy a vitality for
certain types of antitrust conduct,96 this gradual sophistication
and limitation of the rule indicates that an action brought
against the Alliance on a refusal to deal theory would likely
not be subject to summary disposal under the per se rule.
Also working against the application of the per se
condemnation is the reluctance that courts have shown to use
the conclusive presumption in the sports context.97 Due to the
inherently interdependent nature of sports leagues and
associations, and the need for cooperative action to address
problems and allow organized play between competitors,
courts have accorded rules or coalitions in sports
associations- even those which have the potential to restrain
competition- greater deference than typical commercial
combinations receive." While this reasoning has generally
been expressed in cases involving professional sports, 9 the
NCAA Court expressly acknowledged the same cooperative
needs in the college athletics context and refused to apply the
per se standard.' 0
As the foregoing suggests, it seems that the presence of
these two considerations against the use of the per se rule
weigh in favor of the conclusion that the Bowl Alliance will not
be viewed under the harsh per se lamp. The diminished use of
the rule in group boycott and refusal to deal situations, along
96. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRSION, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 4.07 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter
SULLIVAN] (discussing, inter alia, Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46
(1990) and Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) as examples
of modem per se cases).
97. See NCAA v. Ok., 486 U.S. 85.
98. See id. (refusing to apply the per se rule to an NCAA television
restriction); Deesen v. Profl Golfers Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1966)
(upholding PGA rules which restricted player entry into tournaments); Molinas v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (allowing a league
rule that suspended players for gambling).
99. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (in characterizing
the National Football League for antitrust purposes, the Court recognized that
"clubs that make up a professional sports league are not completely independent
competitors, as they depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic
survival."). Id. at 248.
100. NCAA v. Ok., 486 U.S. at 100-01.
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with the unique characteristics of sports markets, combine to
move us into an inquiry of whether the somewhat more
exploratory standard of the quick look rule of reason would be
appropriate against the factual background of the Bowl
Alliance.
3. Quick Look Rule of Reason
As courts fashioned the per se rule to deal with certain
types of commercial behavior under the antitrust laws,'"' a
"sharp dichotomy" developed between its use and that of the
more traditional and elaborate rule of reason standard.0 2 This
existence of two distinct brands of standard sometimes left
courts with an inflexible test that presented difficulties in
categorizing new forms of restraints.0 3 Conduct might
technically fit the classic definition of a "price-fix" or "market
allocation," which would require a per se approach, yet the
circumstances of the case presented the possible existence of
procompetitive goals or effects, which seems to call for the rule
of reason. 4 This situation left courts with the dilemma of
either going against the precedential force and traditional
wisdom of the per se rule, or of allowing a procompetitive
activity to be condemned as an anticompetitive antitrust
violation. 105
Under recent Supreme Court case law, however, this
judicial dilemma seems to have been somewhat ameliorated.
0 6
In the late 1970's, certain section 1 decisions came down that
did not use the per se rule for a given restriction, but also did
not enter into a full-scale rule of reason analysis.1 7 Rather,
101. See GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 56, at 177; United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), is thought to be the first major use of
the per se rule for horizontal restraints. See id.
102. Gellhorn and Kovacic mark the emergence of this dichotomy after the
Socony-Vacuum case in 1940. Id. at 179.
103. See id. at 215-17; SULLIVAN, supra note 96, at § 4.08.
104. See GELLHORN, ANTITRusT LAw, supra note 56, at 197.
105. See id. at 210-12..
106. See SULLIVAN, supra note 96, at §4.08.
107. See id. (citing National Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978), as an early example of the Court's "changing analysis of horizontal
restraints.").
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the approach seemed to fall in the middle-ground between
these poles, by engaging in some analysis of the specific
restraint to glean its purpose and effects, but not fully delving
into the economic details of the restraint and its market. 08
This method takes a "quick look" at the restraint to see if it
had the actual purpose or effect of hurting competition, or
whether it in fact displayed some procompetitive elements or
enhanced output. 109 As the Third Circuit put it, the quick look
rule applies "where per se condemnation is inappropriate, but
where 'no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate anticompetitive character' of an inherently
suspect restraint."" ° This approach has been lauded by
scholars and seems to have given courts greater flexibility by
giving them a viable third option when analyzing unique or
ambiguous restraints.' 1
The quick look rule of reason, unlike its older and more
complex cousin discussed below, operates in a fairly simple
way by giving courts an intermediate step to guide their
section 1 analysis to the correct level of scrutiny. In a sense, it
is not even an independent test itself, but rather it resembles
a railroad switching mechanism, directing certain types of
cases onto either the per se or rule of reason "track,"
depending on the nature of the conduct at issue.
The court will start, once a restraint is found, by
presuming there is harm to competition."2 Therefore, the
defendant will be required to "promulgate 'some competitive
justification' for the restraint, 'even in the absence of detailed
market analysis' indicating actual profit maximization or
108. See id.
109. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(refusing to apply the per se rule to a group refusal to cooperate with insurance
companies' X-ray requirement, but finding the boycott unlawful due to its
restraining character); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery
and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (declining to label the expulsion of plaintiff
from a cooperative an illegal group boycott, pointing to lack of actual
anticompetitive effects).
110. United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)
(quoting NCAA VOK, 468 U.S. at 109).
111. See, e.g., GELLHORN, supra note 56, at 213; SULLIVAN, supra note 96, at
§§ 8.04, 8.13, 8.14.
112. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 669.
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increased cost to the consumer resulting from the restraint."
13
If the defendant is unable to show procompetitive reasons for
the restraining conduct, "the presumption of adverse
competitive impact prevails and 'the court condemns the
practice without ado.""' 4 Thus, without a showing of a
redeeming aspect of the restraint which furthers
procompetitive goals, the quick look switch directs the case to
the per se track, which inexorably leads to the condemnation
of the restraint.
On the other hand, if the defendant is able to offer "sound
procompetitive justifications.. the court must proceed to
weigh the overall reasonableness of the restraint using a full-
scale rule of reason analysis.""5 Thus, to continue the analogy,
the showing of economic reasons which promote competition"6
will activate the switch and send the litigants to the rule of
reason track, upon which the court will more fully explore the
merits and demerits of the restraint and how it affects the
given market.
Applied to the Bowl Alliance, the quick look doctrine
would appear to switch us to the rule of reason track. While
the Alliance is facially a restraint of trade, since it inhibits
both non-Alliance conferences from playing in certain high-
profile bowls, and non-Alliance bowls from bidding for
desirable Alliance teams, the members of the Bowl Alliance are
likely to be capable of forwarding procompetitive reasons for
these restraints to the satisfaction of a court. Specifically, they
could argue (as they have)"7 that the Alliance enhances the
quality of post-season college football by assuring a national
113. Id. (quoting NCAA v. Ok., 468 U.S. at 110).
114. Id. (quoting Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992).
115. Id.
116. Note that only procompetitive justifications will suffice. Courts have long
and unambiguously held that goals or effects of efficiency, reduction of "ruinous"
competition, increase in individual product quality, or the like will not save a an
antitrust restraint from the per se rule. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
117. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2 at 33-38, 157-62 (statement of Roy
Kramer, Southeastern Conference Commissioner).
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championship game each year, which in turn benefits all
football schools and all of the bowls by increasing the total fan
base for college football."8 While this argument might be
disputed by critics, the threshold for showing that the
restraint has some procompetitive elements appears to be
relatively low."' Moreover, even if a court looking at the
Alliance believed that the members had other than competitive
motives in creating the Alliance agreements, it would still
survive the quick look test if it was shown that the effects of
the Alliance are procompetitive. Most significantly, the Alliance
could point to the fact that the incidence of post-season
national championship games has in fact increased markedly
since the advent of the Alliance.1 20 It also might be able to
show that college football as a whole has prospered since the
creation of the Alliance, but such a possibility has not been
explored, and is somewhat questionable. However it is framed,
it appears that, despite the potential threat to competition that
the Alliance poses, its members would be able to make a
sufficient initial showing of procompetitive elements to survive
quick look scrutiny and direct the inquiry to the rule of reason
track.
4. Rule of Reason
The oldest and most common judicial method of dealing
with conduct alleged to be in restraint of trade is the rule of
reason. This basic anticompetitive rule has its roots in 18th
Century English Common Law 2' and was quickly adopted by
United States courts construing section 1 of the Sherman
Act.' 22 Of the three main section 1 approaches, the rule of
118. See id.
119. See Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 296-97; United States v. Brown
University, 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993).
120. In the first five years of the Alliance, three of them ended with a national
championship game. In the previous 45 years, the top two teams had only met
twice. Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 36.
121. The rule of reason was born in the English case of Mitchel v. Reynolds.
See HANDLER, supra note 57, at 43-45 (excerpting Mitchel, 1 P.Wms. 181, 24
Eng.Rep. 347 (K.B.1711)).
122. See NCAA v. Ok., 468 U.S. 85; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania




reason is the most thorough, requiring a careful look at the
markets and parties affected. 123 The focus of the rule of reason
inquiry is not so much the legal category in which the conduct
falls, but rather on the actual purpose and effects, and how
they affect competition.'24 Therefore, due to its pragmatism,
this long-standing 25 rule entails a detailed case-by-case
economic and legal analysis to determine whether the conduct
qualifies as an unreasonable restraint under section 1.126
The rule of reason involves a burden-shifting between the
parties.127 Initially, the plaintiff must show that "the alleged
combination or agreement produced adverse, anticompetitive
effects within the relevant product and geographic markets."'28
Such effects include reduction of output, increase in price, or
deterioration of quality.' 29 The defendant's market power-
meaning actual market share, the ability to raise prices above
competitive rates, or the possession of some particular
advantage in the market- is also relevant to this showing,
particularly if the restraint's effects are difficult to clearly
delineate. 3 ° If the plaintiff is able make a showing of market
power or "actual anticompetitive effects," the burden will then
shift to the section 1 defendant, who must show "that the
123. See Annotation, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade
Practices, 54 AM. JUR. 2D 48 (1996).
124. See id.
125. The Brown University court observed that "the contours of the traditional
rule of reason inquiry have remained largely unchanged since they were first
defined in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States." 5 F.3d at 668 n.8 (citing
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
126. See Annotation, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade
Practices, 54 AM. JUR. 2D 48 (1996). The National Legal Research Group gives
five factual aspects of the business and the restraint that the trier of fact should
consider in making a reasonableness determination: "(1) its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; (2) the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable; (3) the history of the restraint and the evil believed to exist;
(4) the reason for adopting the particular restraint; and (5) the purpose or end
sought to be attained by the restraint." Id. (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S.
231).
127. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 668.
128. Id. (citing Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir.





challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently procompetitive
objective."'3 ' Even if the defendant can show procompetitive
elements, however, it is not out of the woods yet. The plaintiff
may answer the defendant's justifications by arguing that the
restraint is not "reasonably necessary to achieve the stated
objective." '32 To prove this, the plaintiff may argue that the
restraint does not further the stated objective or that there are
"less restrictive alternatives" to the conduct in question, thus
the antitrust law should strike down that which is
unnecessarily anticompetitive.'33 After these questions are
explored at length, taking into account the markets affected,
the intention of the parties, the actual operation of the
restraint, and the alternatives, the trier of fact will then decide
whether the restraint is "unreasonable" under the
circumstances. 1
34
a. The Bowl Alliance Under the Rule of Reason
Since I have concluded that the per se rule would not be
likely to apply to the Bowl Alliance, neither through its
categorization in a per se category nor through the quick look
mechanism, the rule of reason remains the best analytical
approach with which to examine the legality of the Alliance.
Indeed, use of the rule of reason in this situation is not a
forced choice, but rather it seems the most appropriate of the
tests, especially given the uniqueness of the markets involved
and the restraint at issue, as well as the Alliance's assertion of
having positive effects on these markets.
As has been pointed out above, the rule of reason is a
complex, highly fact-specific antitrust inquiry. What would
happen in the hypothetical section 1 suit against the Bowl
Alliance would largely be a function of the court's
categorization of the restraint and the market, and, most
importantly, would be subject to a jury's determination of
131. Id. at 669.
132. Id. See also Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 463 (1986).
133. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 669; White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963).
134. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 669.
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whether the Alliance is in fact an "unreasonable" restraint on
competition. Nonetheless, even without an actual case, one
can look at certain aspects of the Alliance agreements to see if
they conform with the legal standard, in order to predict what
might transpire in an antitrust suit. While analyzing this
restraint under the rule of reason, it is useful to remember
that although the rule can often be hideously complicated and
difficult, its focus is quite simple: does the restraint in
question affect competition in the identified markets and, if so,
how necessary is this restraint to an actual procompetitive
end?
The first question, then, to ask under a rule of reason
analysis is whether the restraint has anticompetitive effects or
the participants have market power.'35 Whether the Alliance in
fact has anticompetitive effects is a disputed question, but a
persuasive argument could be made that it does. Proponents
of the Alliance argue that the only effects of the agreements
have been to increase fan interest and revenues. 3 ' Others,
however, have argued that the Alliance's exclusion of
conferences and bowls has resulted in financial and
reputational damage to non-Alliance conferences and
schools."3 7 This, as Professor Roberts phrases it, will lead to
the relegation of the 50 non-Alliance schools to "second tier
status," which hurts competition and detracts from the quality
of the overall product for consumers.'38 It is also possible that
this economic domination of the post-season college football
markets by the Alliance would reduce the number of non-
Alliance bowls in the future, thus reducing product quantity
as well, which is also a cognizable anticompetitive effect. '39 In
addition to these charges of reduction in quality and output,
critics of the Alliance have also argued that the Alliance has
operated to raise prices above the competitive norm, forcing
135. See id. at 668-69; Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985).
136. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 37.
137. According to an official statement by the non-Alliance Plymouth Holiday
Bowl: "Many bowl games already are experiencing alarming declines in
attendance, sponsorships, and television rights fees." Id. at 114.
138. Id. at 151-52.
139. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 668-69.
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networks (and ultimately consumers) to pay disproportionately
high fees for television rights to Alliance games.1
4 0
Moreover, it seems clear that the Alliance easily satisfies
the market power requirement. Alliance teams collected
approximately 95% of the total bowl pool in the 1996-97
season and the Alliance contains over half of the total of
Division I-A football schools. These facts, along with the less
statistically concrete truth that the Alliance conferences and
schools are among the most dominant and popular in recent
years, point to the conclusion of market power for the Alliance.
Considering these arguments, it is unlikely that the Alliance
would be able to avoid the shifting of burden to it, which
would require that it show the procompetitive goals and effects
of the Alliance agreements. It is true that the Alliance has one
major effect (its espoused purpose) that certainly has the
potential to yield beneficial and procompetitive effects: its
creation of a national championship game. It is accepted by all
that this is a desirable goal, and the Alliance has argued that
the enhancement of the possibility of such a game occurring
each year' will benefit college football.'42 This may be difficult
to prove empirically, especially after such a short time, but a
court and jury are quite likely to consider this a legitimate
procompetitive goal. The Alliance agreements also seem
factually linked to that goal, which would create the necessary
nexus between the problem and remedy required by the rule
of reason.
Yet this beneficial goal alone will not necessarily save the
restraint from antitrust violation. 4 ' For one thing the trier of
fact must also consider the intent of the makers of the
restraint in deciding whether the restraint is procompetitive
140. Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 154. At the hearing, Professor Roberts
contended that even though the costs of attending a bowl have not significantly
risen since the inception of the Alliance, the prices charged by Alliance schools
has increased markedly, which is an indicator of "monopoly prices." See id.
141. In fact, with the inclusion of the Big 10 and Pac 10 in the 1998-99
season, and the Alliance provision that any team ranked No. 1 or 2 will
automatically get an invitation to the championship, a national championship
game each year is all but guaranteed.
142. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 37-38.
143. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
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and thus reasonable. In the words of Justice Douglas, "[the
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
be attained, are all relevant facts." ' Although there is not
extant evidence of an actual anticompetitive motive by the
Alliance members, the creation of this broad association of
teams, conferences, and bowls which excludes based on
conference affiliation might reasonably give rise to a suspicion
that the intent behind the creation of the Alliance was not
mainly procompetitive. Moreover, even if one assumes that the
creation of a national championship game was the true goal
behind the Alliance, in order for the restraint to survive
antitrust scrutiny, it still must be shown to be "reasonably
necessary" for the achievement of that goal.'4
One method of determining whether a restraint was
reasonably necessary is to look at alternative methods which
could have brought about the same goal and deciding whether
those would have been less restrictive to competition.
46
Although the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine as an
independent grounds for finding a restraint invalid under the
rule of reason has not been clearly defined by the case law,'47
an inspection of what other possible solutions for the problem
existed also allows the trier of fact to better understand the
reasonableness of the defendants' conduct. In other words, the
presence of other, less anticompetitive avenues that the
Alliance could have taken to achieve its stated goal is powerful
evidence that the restraint was not in fact "reasonably
necessary" for the achievement of the legitimate goal. In the
case of the Alliance, there is a strong argument that the
complex agreements among the member conferences and
bowls is excessively restrictive and exclusive to achieve the
simple goal of a single national championship game each year.
144. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (quoting
Chicago Bd. of trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
145. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 669.
146. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 96.
147. See id. (Professor Roberts called it an "often referred to but conceptually
elusive" doctrine, but pointed out that "many courts have applied some form of
less restrictive alternative notion in rule of reason cases, and virtually none have
rejected it outright." Id.).
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Many have called for an Division I-A playoff, similar to
those conducted by the NCAA in the other college football
divisions.'48 This system has both strengths and weaknesses.
On the positive side of the ledger is that a playoff would not
"automatically" exclude certain teams or conferences from a
chance at the national title, as the Alliance allegedly does. It
would also, if run like the NCAA Men's Basketball
Tournament, allow more teams to benefit from post-season
revenue, since the profit-sharing would not be restricted to
certain conferences, but rather would be spread among all the
Division I-A teams in. varying shares.'49 On the negative side,
however, there are also powerful considerations. First, one
could argue that a playoff would not achieve the goal of
matching up the top two teams in the nation each year, since
upsets might commonly allow a lower-ranked team to advance
over a higher-ranked opponent in the playoff. ' ° Therefore, the
playoff "alternative" might not be an alternative at all for the
purposes of the rule of reason. Additionally, the Alliance has a
strong argument that a playoff system, which would likely
have a 16-team/15-game format,'5 ' would decrease output,
since the current number of bowls is around twenty. 2
Thus- the argument might go- less games means less
football, less television presence, and less all-around revenue.
Not only would this harm the television market for bowls, but
it would either completely wipe out the bowl market or (if the
NCAA were to integrate the playoff system with the bowl
games) would at least reduce the total number of bowls.
Finally, there may also be some degree of difficulty in picking
which teams go to the playoffs, akin to the controversy that
148. See e.g., id. at 9-11 (Statement of Senator Mitch McConnell); Id. at 29
(Statement of Pennsylvania State University Quarterback Wally Richardson).
149. See id. at 9-11.
150. One has to only look at 1997's NCAA Basketball Tournament to see this
in action. The University of Arizona, despite being fifth in its conference and a
No. 4 seed in its region, won the tournament and with it the national title.
151. See Id. at 47.
152. In the 1998-99 season, there were 22 post-season bowl games. See
College Football Fans Guide: NCAA (visited Jan 28, 1999)
<http://www.seattletimes.com/sports/football/collegeguide/ncaa/nationbowl
sked.html>.
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has surrounded the national rankings in college football to
date. Given these negatives, therefore, it would be difficult to
maintain that the playoff system, although it may have other
non-antitrust merits, would be a viable less restrictive
alternative in a section 1 analysis.
More tenable is the proposition, forwarded by Professor
Roberts and others, of a return to the pre-Alliance
invitation/bidding bowl system, with one national
championship game mandated and administered by the
NCAA.'15 3 This, argue its proponents, would have the advantage
of keeping the bowl and television markets almost totally
competitive, yet would satisfy the fan demand for a game
between the nation's two best teams. 5 4 Under this system,
conferences and bowls would be able to bargain freely for bowl
invitations, and television networks would be free to bargain
with bowls, with all parties being subject to the condition that
if a team ended the season ranked first or second, it would be
released from all other obligations to allow it to play in the
championship game that year.
In addition to achieving the stated goal that the Alliance
gives for its existence, the national championship, this single
game system seems to have more equitable results. As
Professor Roberts proposes it, the two participating schools
would receive an individual sum for playing (Roberts puts it at
$1 million per team), 5 with the balance of the substantial
profit generated from television and advertising revenue to be
divided among the 110 Division I-A teams equally, as is done
with the revenue from the Men's NCAA Basketball
Tournament.' 6
While this scheme has much fairness appeal, it is not
generalized fairness that section 1 is concerned with- it is the
protection of competitive markets. Therefore, one should be
153. See Antitrust Hearing,,supra note 2, at 96-97.
154. See id.
155. Although this may seem like a significant pay cut from the $8-$10
million payoffs in the top bowls, it should be kept in mind that the participating
school receives only about 10% of that total, while the remainder is shared
among the conference and its member schools.
156. See Antitrust Hearing, supra note 2, at 96-97.
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sure to specifically look at the markets involved and predict
how they would be affected by this plan. Although such
questions are inherently speculative, it appears that both the
bowl and television markets"5 7 would be able to continue
competitively under this system, which is the paramount goal
of the antitrust laws.
The bowl market would remain healthy under the
championship game system since (1) all bowls would be able
to compete for desirable teams other than the top two,
regardless of conference affiliation and (2) if the championship
game was played in a bowl on a rotating basis, a new and
prosperous bidding system would emerge for the bowls to
pursue, similar to the Olympic Games host city selection
process.
Likewise, the television market would seem to be less
encumbered by this plan than it is under the Alliance system.
Although the championship game would be the most desirable
and garner the largest contracts, the contract would be
sanctioned by the NCAA, thus freeing it from the tendencies
(or at least appearances of tendencies) towards the
overexposure of certain teams and conferences as a result of
collateral relationships between members. This would also
have the potential of keeping the price more in line with
market forces, since the sport's regulatory body would set the
price and be accountable to the entire NCAA membership.
Moreover, the networks would be free to bid on the remaining
post-season bowls, which would still promise large fan
support and revenue, especially if they were able to feature
popular or powerful teams, or field traditional rivalries.
In the final analysis, however, the actual viability of this
precise scheme is not as important as what its discussion
illustrates: that the Alliance does not appear to be either the
necessary or desirable means to reach the goal of a national
championship game. It would be safe to say that the
reasonableness restraint, if ever properly brought as a section
1 claim in a court of the United States,158 would be a question
157. For a discussion of how I chose and defined these markets, see supra
Part III.B.
158. Professor Roberts expresses doubt that such a suit will ever realistically
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left to the trier of fact who would have ample fodder for a
finding that the Alliance, whatever its true or stated goals,
operates to exclude both bowls and conferences from a
prosperous portion of the market and to force prices above the
fair market rate. The rule of reason, by definition, creates
results that cannot be predetermined since it is so dependent
on the trier of fact's view of reasonableness, but in this case
there seems to be a significant chance that the Alliance would
crumble under the scrutiny of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
IV
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of the Bowl Alliance and its
possible antitrust violations vividly illustrates the tensions
constantly at work in the arena of antitrust law. The Alliance,
to take an optimistic view, was conceived and designed to
address a long-felt need in post-season college football. It is
the product of much effort and expenditure by its members to
promote it and further its goals. In fact, the Alliance has been
shown to be somewhat successful in obtaining its stated
objective, an objective that almost any college football fan
would endorse. Taken in a positive light, the Alliance was a
large and well-meditated effort to organize and unify a
somewhat chaotic Division I-A football market.
None of this positive motive, effort, or result however, will
immunize such an agreement from antitrust scrutiny. Several
times during the Senate Subcommittee Hearing,
Commissioner Kramer and others insisted that the Alliance
was the imperfect product of a good-faith attempt to correct
some of the ills which beset college football. While this may be
true, it misunderstands the operation of our antitrust laws.
Economic experience and legal wisdom clearly tell us that
restraints between competitors must be vigilantly watched and
be brought, given the problem of proving standing, the enormous expense
involved, the disincentive for the regulatory agencies to get involved, the
possibility of reprisal from the Alliance against any plaintiff conference, bowl, or
school, and the inevitable uncertainty of a favorable verdict. See Antitrust
Hearing, supra note 2, at 99-100.
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immediately sacrificed if, in the pursuit of individual goals, the
larger goal of competition was compromised.
The task of defining markets, delineating parties, and
discerning the correct level of review is always difficult in
section 1 cases, and the case of the Bowl Alliance seems to
present a particularly complicated challenge. Nonetheless, a
close examination of the markets and the prior case law yields
some answers. It seems clear that the background of this case
and the uniqueness of the agreements require a meaningful
rule of reason analysis, which was attempted in part here, but
which cannot be properly done without much more data,
many more pages, and an actual case to distill the pertinent
issues. While we cannot accurately predict what the results of
this complex examination would be, we might be able to set
out some conditional theories. If this analysis yields a result
that the Alliance does enhance bowls in general, gives all
Division I-A schools benefits and a fair chance, and gives
television networks value for their contracts, the Alliance
should be vigorously upheld as a valid restraint with
procompetitive effects. If, on the other hand, the result is the
stifling of smaller bowls and less dominant conferences, the
centralization of economic and talent wealth in only the
Alliance schools, and the charging of unfairly inflated prices,
then the Alliance must, under the simple command of the
Sherman Act, be struck down, no matter how much positive
intention and effort was put into its creation.
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